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Fabricated memorya b s t r a c t1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether memories can have any beneﬁt for their subjects while being dis-
torted.1 There are a number of things that one may have in mind by ‘beneﬁt’ while referring to memory. For that reason,
the formulation of the issue that will occupy us here admits several possible readings. It will therefore make for clarity if we
begin our discussion by specifying, in Section 1, the types of beneﬁts with which we will be concerned in this discussion.
One may also have different things in mind by ‘distortion,’ depending on one’s views about the function of memory. Thus, in
order to formulate the topic of our discussion precisely, I will distinguish, in Section 2, two pictures of what memory is supposed
to do, and two associated notions of distortion. Next, I will put forward two types of memories that, I will argue, can qualify as
cases of beneﬁcial distortion under very speciﬁc circumstances. In Section 3, I will discuss the case of so-called ‘observer mem-
ories’ and, in Section 4, I will discuss the case of so-called ‘fabricated memories.’ My contention will be that, in both cases, some
of those memories can, on the one hand, be advantageous for the subject to have while, on the other hand, her faculty of mem-
ory has failed to perform its proper function by producing them. The signiﬁcance of this claim for the two pictures of what
memory is supposed to do will be explored in Section 5.
2. Epistemic beneﬁts and adaptive beneﬁts
There are at least two ways in which having a memory can be beneﬁcial for a subject. One of them is epistemic. Having a
memory may provide the subject with knowledge of, or at least justiﬁcation for a belief about, the past. The memory does
this by supplying the subject with evidence, or grounds, for a certain belief; a belief in the content of the memory or, moreproduces
arry will
how one
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puts the subject in a position to think about, and refer to, that event. When the evidence provided by the memory is good evi-
dence, it is beneﬁcial for the subject to be in that position. For the belief that the subject can form on the basis of her memory
will, in that case, be justiﬁed. Why is that good for the subject? Beliefs are the sort of mental state which can be true or false.
They are in some sense normatively governed by, or aimed at, truth. From the point of view of achieving truth, it is good for the
subject to have justiﬁed beliefs rather than unjustiﬁed beliefs because the former, unlike the latter, tend to be true. Furthermore,
when justiﬁed beliefs are true, they are such that they could not have easily been false. This is because, when justiﬁed beliefs are
true, they are not accidentally true, or true by luck. This feature of justiﬁed beliefs confers a certain stability upon them:
Whereas merely true beliefs are ﬂeeting in that they are easy to undermine, justiﬁed beliefs are more likely to remain fast
in response to conﬂicting information.3
Notice that, in order for the subject to enjoy this type of beneﬁt from her memories, the subject’s faculty of memory must
be trustworthy in the following sense. It must deliver memories that are likely to be accurate when they have been appro-
priately produced.4 Imagine that, for any memory of a subject, the fact that the memory in question was properly generated
makes no difference as to whether the content of that memory is likely to be case or not. Suppose, now, that the subject has
a particular memory. It is hard to see why the subject would be justiﬁed in believing the content of it. After all, on the scenario
that we are considering, any of the memories that the subject is having could easily be misinforming her about her past. Thus,
the belief that the subject would form by taking the content of her memory at face value is not likely to achieve truth. Suppose,
however, that it does. Still, it does not seem that the belief in question would be justiﬁed. For if the fact that the memory was
properly generated makes no difference as to whether its content is likely to be the case or not, then it seems that the belief in
question could have easily been false. It turned out to be true, but the fact that the memory on the basis of which the belief was
formed was properly generated did not contribute to that outcome. It seems, therefore, that in order for the subject to be in a
position to form justiﬁed beliefs on the basis of her memories (and thus beneﬁt from them epistemically), those memories must
have the property of being such that if they have been properly generated, then they are likely to be accurate.5
Another way in which having a memory can be beneﬁcial for the subject is by being adaptive. Having a memory may
allow the subject to form a belief about the past which has a certain instrumental value for her. The belief may serve to rep-
resent the past in the way in which the subject needs to represent it in order for her to achieve one of her goals.6 Oftentimes,
the relevant goal involves experiencing a certain type of emotion. In this scenario, the memory plays the role of supplying the
subject with a representation of her past that is conducive to experiencing the emotion that is being sought by the subject;
typically a positive emotion. When the memory allows the subject to represent her past in the way in which she is seeking
to represent it from an emotional point of view, it is beneﬁcial for the subject to have that memory. (We could call this type
of adaptive beneﬁt, an ‘affectively adaptive’ type of beneﬁt.) Other times, the relevant goal involves making sense of one’s
own behaviour towards, and one’s own thoughts about, some particular person or situation. In that scenario, the memory plays
the role of supplying the subject with a representation of her past which makes her current behaviour towards some person or
situation intelligible to herself, and it allows her to explain why she has certain thoughts towards the relevant person or2 Why the qualiﬁcation? By taking one of her memories at face value, a subject may form a number of different beliefs depending on which aspect of its
content she is assenting to. Thus, it is possible that the subject forms a belief in, strictly speaking, the content of her memory but, more commonly, she will form
a belief in some part of that content. Since the content of a memory may contain some accurate details while containing, at the same time, other details which
are inaccurate, this means that the very same memory can provide good evidence for one of the beliefs that the subject may form on its basis while not
providing good evidence for another. As a result, a memory can deliver an epistemic beneﬁt for one of the subject’s beliefs while not delivering an epistemic
beneﬁt for another.
3 In addition, if knowledge has an intrinsic value, then it will be beneﬁcial for a subject to have memories that justify her in believing some things about her
past when those justiﬁed beliefs qualify as knowledge. However, we do not need to commit ourselves to the view that knowledge has an intrinsic value for
memories to have an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject. On the idea that knowledge has an intrinsic value, see (Pritchard, Millar, & Haddock, 2011).
4 In fact, the requirement should be relativised to the type of belief that the subject is forming when she is epistemically beneﬁting from one of her
memories. Otherwise, the requirement is clearly too strong: Our memories are not trustworthy in the sense that their whole contents are likely to be accurate
when those memories have been properly generated. For the most part, they are bound to contain some inaccuracies even if they have been properly generated.
Thus, the trustworthiness requirement, as formulated above, yields the result that we are never justiﬁed in forming beliefs on the basis of our memories, which
is highly counter-intuitive. Instead, the requirement needs to be that if a subject is justiﬁed in forming a certain belief on the basis of one of her memories, then
that memory must be trustworthy with regards to the subject matter of the belief being formed. And that feature of the memory may vary depending on which
belief is being formed, since the subject may form a variety of beliefs on the basis of the same memory. (See note 2.) Suppose, for example, that my memory is
totally unreliable with regards to colours but it is very reliable with regards to shapes. Then, I may be justiﬁed in forming a belief about what the phone number
written in some piece of paper which I saw days ago was on the basis of a memory that originates in that perceptual experience of mine. But I would not be
justiﬁed in forming, on the basis of the very same memory, a belief about the colour of the ink in which the phone number was written. For ease of exposition,
though, I will continue to talk of trustworthiness as a requirement on memories, as opposed to a requirement on speciﬁc aspects of their contents (which would
be more precise, but also more cumbersome talk).
5 Notice that the claim is not that trustworthiness is the only property of memories that may put the subject in a position to form justiﬁed beliefs on the basis
of her memories. It is the weaker claim that memories must have that property in order to put the subject in that position. For that reason, it is consistent with
the view that other properties of memories may also contribute to the justiﬁcation of memory beliefs. In particular, it is consistent with the claim that those
memories which cohere well with the rest of the subject’s mental states put the subject in a better position to form justiﬁed beliefs on the basis of them than
those memories which do not.
6 Strictly speaking, then, adaptive beneﬁts are not monadic properties of memories. In other words, it actually makes no sense to say that, from an adaptive
point of view, a subject’s memory is, or is not, beneﬁcial simpliciter. Not only can a subject form a number of different beliefs on the basis of a single memory,
but also a subject can pursue a number of different goals while she has each of those beliefs. For that reason, adaptive beneﬁts are best seen as relations
between a memory that the subject has, and one of her goals. Thus, a memory may carry an adaptive beneﬁt for one of the subject’s goals while not carrying an
adaptive beneﬁt for another.
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hending her own mental life and her own behaviour, it is beneﬁcial for the subject to have that memory as well. (We could call
this type of adaptive beneﬁt, an ‘explanatorily adaptive’ type of beneﬁt.) More generally, from an adaptive point of view, it is
beneﬁcial for the subject to have a memory if representing the past in the way in which that memory presents it to the subject is
an effective means of satisfying one of the subject’s goals.
Notice that, in order for the subject to enjoy an explanatorily adaptive type of beneﬁt from her memories, the subject’s
faculty of memory must provide a ﬁrm structure in the following sense. It must deliver memories that cohere well with the
rest of the subject’s mental states when those memories have been appropriately produced. Why is that? Imagine that, for
any memory of a subject, the fact that the memory in question was properly generated by the subject’s faculty of memory
makes no difference as to whether the content of that memory squares with the things that the subject has learnt about her
past through testimony, and the things that the subject has inferred about her past from other things she knows. Suppose,
now, that the subject has a particular memory. It is hard to see how the subject could create a representation of her past that
made sense of her current behaviour and mental life by believing the content of that memory. For that memory is, on the
scenario that we are considering, likely to be in tension with the behaviour and set of mental states which the subject needs
to make sense of. In order for the subject to be in a position to form, on the basis of her memories, beliefs about her past
whichmake sense of her current mental life and her current behaviour (and thus beneﬁt from them in an explanatorily adap-
tive way), those memories must have the property of being such that if they have been properly generated, then they are
consistent, and cohere well, with rest of the subject’s mental states.
Likewise, in order for the subject to enjoy an affectively adaptive beneﬁt from her memories, the subject’s faculty of mem-
ory must provide a ﬁrm structure in the same sense. Why is that? Imagine that the fact that, for any memory of a subject, the
fact that the memory was properly generated by the subject’s faculty of memory makes no difference as to whether the con-
tent of that memory squares with the contents of the rest of the subject’s mental states which concern the seemingly
remembered event. Suppose, now, that the subject has a particular memory. It is hard to see how the subject could use that
memory to create a representation of a past event which was intended to produce in the subject certain emotions; those
emotions which she is seeking to experience towards the event. For the relevant emotions arguably depend on the subject’s
current thoughts, needs, expectations, intentions and wishes that involve that event. And the memory which is available to
the subject is, on the scenario that we are considering, not likely to be consistent with the contents of those mental states.7 In
order for the subject to be in a position to form, on the basis of her memories, representations of a past event which produce in
her the emotions that she is seeking to experience towards that event (and thus beneﬁt from them in an affectively adaptive
way), those memories must have the property of being such that if they have been properly generated, then they are consistent,
and cohere well, with the rest of the subject’s mental states.8
What is the relation between the two types of beneﬁts? Adaptive beneﬁts have been introduced in terms of goal satis-
faction. In normal circumstances, a subject has goals of various types. Some of them are practical goals, such as the goal
of being at a certain place at a certain time. Others are theoretical goals, such as the goal of having beliefs that are held
for good reasons (as opposed to biases or prejudices). The question of how epistemic and adaptive beneﬁts are related con-
cerns, on the one hand, the distinction between these two types of goals and, on the other hand, the distinction between
justiﬁed belief and true belief. Let me explain.
For the purposes of achieving a practical goal, it is enough to have a true belief about the means that will maximise one’s
chances of achieving that goal. Suppose, for instance, that I have the goal of attending a meeting in the city at a certain time,
and I want to catch the bus to go to the city. I seem to remember that the bus is supposed to come to the relevant stop at
10 am. On the basis of my memory, I form the belief that the bus will be at the stop at 10 am. As it happens, my memory
about these matters is highly unreliable, so I am not justiﬁed in having that belief. But it turns out that the bus does show
up at 10 am. For the purposes of getting to my meeting on time, it was not necessary for my belief to be justiﬁed. It turned
out to be true, which is all I needed to achieve my goal. Now, justiﬁed beliefs are more likely to be true than unjustiﬁed
beliefs. For that reason, if a memory carries an epistemic beneﬁt for me, then it is likely to carry an adaptive beneﬁt with
regards to some practical goals of mine. But there is no guarantee of that, since justiﬁed beliefs may not be true. Suppose,
for example, that my memory is highly reliable when it comes to public transport schedules, but the bus is late and it shows
up at 10.30 am. Then, my memory carried an epistemic beneﬁt for me. It yielded the justiﬁed belief that the bus would be at
the stop at 10 am. But the belief turned out to be false, which did not help me to achieve my goal of attending my meeting.
With regards to that practical goal, therefore, my memory did not carry an adaptive beneﬁt for me. If, however, we take into7 The thought here is simply this. Suppose that I need to think about some trip that I once took with my grandmother, who has passed away, in a pleasant
way. And suppose that I need to think about that trip pleasantly because I love my grandmother. Then, if my memories of the trip with my grandmother are
going to help me satisfy that need, then it better be the case that, when those memories are properly generated, they are not in tension with the fact that I love
her. For if my memory is functioning properly when it generates memories of my trip with my grandmother which present her to me as having qualities that
are not worthy of love, then those memories will not help me think of the time that I spent with her in a pleasant way.
8 Notice that the claim is not that coherence is the only property of memories that may help the subject to achieve some of her goals by forming beliefs on the
basis of her memories. It is the weaker claim that, with regards to the goals of experiencing certain emotions and making sense of certain attitudes and
instances of behaviour, memories must have the property of coherence in order to help the subject to achieve those goals. For that reason, the claim is
consistent with the view that other properties of memories, such as trustworthiness, may also help the subject to achieve some of her goals. If a subject needs to
locate an object or substance that she perceived in the past (to eat it or drink it, for example), then a trustworthy memory of where that object or substance has
been perceived will clearly help the subject to satisfy that need more than an untrustworthy memory would.
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me will carry some adaptive beneﬁt. For a memory that carries an epistemic beneﬁt for me allows me to form a justiﬁed
belief on the basis of it. And if my belief is justiﬁed, then it seems that I am satisfying my theoretical goal of believing for
good reasons.
What about the converse? Do memories which carry an adaptive beneﬁt always provide an epistemic beneﬁt for the sub-
ject as well? It depends, once again, on the type of goal that the memory is helping the subject to achieve. If the goal in ques-
tion is the theoretical goal of believing for good reasons, then it does seem that the memory will provide an epistemic beneﬁt
for the subject. But if the memory is helping the subject to satisfy one of her practical goals, then the memory does not need
to do this by putting the subject in a position to form a belief that is justiﬁed. As we have just seen, a memory may be
untrustworthy (and, for that reason, fail to provide an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject), and yet it may help the subject
to achieve one of her practical goals (and, for that reason, provide an adaptive beneﬁt for her). As a matter of fact, the dis-
cussion in Sections 3 and 4 below is meant to illustrate this possibility with some interesting cases of memory.
To sum up, memories can have an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject, and they can also have an adaptive beneﬁt for the
subject. Furthermore, those beneﬁts may be related or not, depending on the subject’s goals. However, in order for a memory
to carry either of those two beneﬁts, the subject’s faculty of memory must be functioning properly when it delivers it. Inter-
estingly, ‘functioning properly’ seems to mean something different in each case. The two types of beneﬁts that we appreciate
in memories reveal two conceptions of what memory is supposed to do; two conceptions of the function of memory. These
two conceptions are often assumed to be opposed to each other and, for that reason, they give rise to competing notions of
what a distorted memory is. Let us consider the two pictures of memory in order.
3. Preservative memory and reconstructive memory
There is a popular conception of memory within philosophy according to which the function of memory is content pres-
ervation. Memory is supposed to register and store the content of those (typically, perceptual) experiences that we had in the
past by producing memories which inherit their contents from those experiences. On this ‘storage’ conception of memory,
then, a subject’s faculty of memory functions properly when the contents of the memories delivered by it match the contents
of the subject’s past experiences on which those memories originate.9 And, with this preservative notion of proper function,
comes an associated notion of distortion: On the storage conception of memory, a subject’s faculty of memory has produced a
distorted memory when the content of that memory does not match the content of the subject’s past experience on which the
memory originates.
To the extent that one appreciates the epistemic beneﬁt of having properly generated memories, one will ﬁnd the storage
conception of memory appealing. After all, if a subject’s faculty of memory adequately carries out the preservative function
that this conception of memory attributes to it, then this will allow a memory produced by it to be epistemically beneﬁcial
for the subject.10 Would something weaker than the preservation of the whole content of the original experience be enough for
the resulting memory to be epistemically beneﬁcial for the subject? Let us recall that the epistemic beneﬁt that a memory may
have for a subject depends on the belief that the subject is forming on the basis of that memory. And what is required for the
memory to be beneﬁcial relative to the belief that the subject is forming is the reliability of, not the whole content of the mem-
ory, but only the parts of it which are relevant for the content of the belief being formed. Suppose, for example, that my faculty
of memory is reliable with regards to which actions I witnessed in the past but not with regards to which people were involved.
Suppose, furthermore, that I have a memory of my brother tickling my sister mercilessly while we were kids. As it happens, it
was me, and not my brother, who ticked my sister mercilessly. Now, imagine that I form, on the basis of that memory, the belief
that someone was ticked mercilessly while I was a kid. In that case, my memory is epistemically beneﬁcial with regards to that
belief, but the whole content of the experience on which that memory originates has not needed to be preserved for it to carry
that epistemic beneﬁt. It was enough that my faculty of memory was trustworthy with regards to certain aspects in the contents
of the memories that it delivers, namely, the actions being remembered.11
On the other hand, there is a popular conception of memory within psychology wherein memory is not a passive device
for registering and reproducing contents. It is instead a faculty akin to imagination in its creative capacity. The main tenet of9 Versions of this picture can be found, for instance, in (Aristotle, 1972, 28–32), (Locke, 1975, 149–153), (Hume, 2000, 12), (Broad, 1937, 239–41), (Malcolm,
1963, 208), (Martin & Deutscher, 1966, 163) and (Shoemaker, 1984, 19). Thomas Reid, for example, seems to endorse this view when he claims: ‘Things
remembered must be things formerly perceived or known. I remember the transit of Venus over the sun in the year 1769. I must therefore have perceived it at
the time it happened, otherwise I could not now remember it’ (Reid, 1969, 326).
10 The reason for this is the following. If the function of the faculty of memory, when it produces a memory, is to reproduce the content of the perceptual
experience on which that memory originates, then it will be the case that if the faculty of memory carries out its function appropriately, then the resulting
memory is likely to be accurate. For the only scenario in which a memory that preserves the content of the original perceptual experience could be inaccurate is
by originating on a past episode of misperception. And this is not, as a matter of fact, the likely scenario.
11 Why is this important? Often our memories are reliable with regards to the general idea about, or ‘gist’ of, an event that we experienced or witnessed in the
past even though they are not reliable with regards to the details of it. (On memory for gist versus detail, see (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000).) An issue that
arises, then, is whether the gist accuracy of a memory is enough for it to carry an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject. The point above is that this will depend on
which belief the subject is forming on the basis of her memory; which belief the memory is supposed to justify. If it is a belief about the gist of the event, the
memory will carry, in virtue of its reliability, an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject. If, on the other hand, the subject’s belief concerns the details of the event, the
memory will not carry such a beneﬁt for the subject.
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sentations of our past by integrating content that we have acquired through our own experience with content from other
sources, such as testimony, inference and imagination. Elizabeth Loftus, for example, describes this picture as ‘a new para-
digm of memory, shifting our view from the video-recorder model, in which memories are interpreted as the literal truth, to
a reconstructionist model, in which memories are understood as creative blendings of fact and ﬁction.’12 The reference to an
element of ﬁction in the integration process is telling. For memory, on this conception, is not meant to represent the past as we
experienced it to be the case. Instead, the function of memory is to reconstruct the past in order to help us build a smooth and
robust narrative of our lives.
On the narrative conception of memory, then, a subject’s faculty of memory functions properly when the contents of the
memories that it delivers have been reconstructed so as to easily ﬁt together with the contents of the subject’s beliefs about
her past. And, with this reconstructive notion of proper function, comes an associated notion of distortion: On the narrative
conception of memory, a subject’s faculty of memory has produced a distorted memory, when the reconstructive process has
not yielded a memory that meshes well with the contents of the subject’s beliefs about herself and her past and, for that
reason, it does not ﬁt into the subject’s narrative of her life. To the extent that one appreciates the adaptive beneﬁt of having
properly generated memories, one will ﬁnd the narrative conception of memory appealing. After all, if a subject’s faculty of
memory adequately carries out the reconstructive function that this conception of memory attributes to it, then this will
allow the memories that the faculty produces to be beneﬁcial for the subject from an adaptive point of view.13
Having distinguished these two conceptions of memory, two questions naturally arise. One question is which of the two
conceptions is right in describing what the function of memory is. We will address that question in Section 5. A different
(and, at this point, more pressing) question is which of the two conceptions is right in describingwhatmemory does; whether
it is the function of memory to carry out the relevant operation or not. The answer to this question seems to be that, to some
extent, both conceptions are right. Reconstruction is amatter of degree. Themore input from sources of information other than
the experience onwhich thememory originates, themore reconstructedwill the content of thatmemory be. And theremay be
extreme cases in which no part of the memory’s content has been inherited from the experience on which the memory orig-
inates. (Perhaps somepathological cases of confabulatorymemory fall into this category.) But the fact of thematter is thatmost
of our memories contain some pieces of information that they have inherited from the contents of the experiences on which
they originate. Conversely, preservation is also a matter of degree. The more information is inherited from the content of the
original experience, the more preservative will the content of the resulting memory be. And there may be extreme cases in
which the whole content of the memory has been inherited from the experience on which the memory originates. (Perhaps
cases of so-called ‘eidetic’ memory fall into this category.) But the fact of thematter is thatmost of ourmemories contain some
pieces of information that they have not inherited from the contents of the experiences onwhich they originate. It seems, then,
that our memories preserve, to some degree, the information that we acquired in past experience and, to some degree, they
reconstruct it. Which explains the attraction and popularity of both conceptions of memory.
Pulling apart the preservative function of memory from its reconstructive function helps us to appreciate that the original
issue of whether memories can have any beneﬁt for the subject while being distorted actually divides into two issues: The
ﬁrst one is whether it is possible for a subject’s faculty of memory not to carry out its reconstructive function while it gen-
erates a memory, and yet for that memory to have an epistemic beneﬁt for the subject. The second one is whether it is pos-
sible for a subject’s faculty of memory not to carry out its preservative function while it generates a memory, and yet for that
memory to have an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject. In what follows, I will concentrate on addressing the latter issue. I will
argue that memories which have been unreliably produced can nonetheless have an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject based on
two cases of memory distortion; so-called ‘observer memories’ and ‘fabricated memories.’ Let us now turn to these two
interesting types of memories.
4. Observer memories of trauma
A memory may present a past event to its subject from two types of visual perspectives. One of them is the type of per-
spective from which the subject would have experienced the event if the subject had witnessed it (or had went through it) in
the past. By having a memory that presents a past event from a perspective of this type, the subject visualises the event, but
she does not visualise herself as part of it. Let us call memories that present events from a perspective of this type, ‘ﬁrst-per-
son’ or ‘ﬁeld’ memories. A memory may also present a past event from the type of perspective that a different observer
would have had to occupy in the past in order to witness the remembered event with the subject as a participant of it.
By having a memory that presents the past event from a perspective of this type, the subject visualises not only the event
but she also visualises herself, as it were, from the outside. Let us call memories that present events from a perspective of this
type, ‘third-person’ or ‘observer’ memories. In this section, I wish to put forward the claim that observer memories can qual-
ify as a case of beneﬁcial memory distortion.12 In (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, 5). On the narrative picture of memory, see (Barclay & De Cooke, 1988) as well.
13 The reason for this is the following. If the function of the faculty of memory, when it produces a memory, is to reconstruct the subject’s past in order to
create a robust and smooth narrative of her life, then it will be the case that if the faculty of memory carries out its function appropriately, then the resulting
memory meshes well with the subject’s current mental states. And this is, as we have seen, a feature of memories which they are required to have for them to
provide an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject.
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that they are indeed distorted. From a preservative point of view, it seems quite clear that they are. Suppose that, years
ago, I suffered an accident while driving, and I now remember the accident by having an observer memory of it. In virtue
of having this memory, I picture the event from the point of view of a nearby pedestrian on the street, thus being able to
visualise some details of my own physical appearance while I was at the wheel. Suppose that, on the basis of my memory,
I form the belief that, at the time of the accident, I appeared to be unshaven and my hair appeared to be dishevelled. These
facts about my appearance are not facts that I perceived at the time of the accident. (Let us stipulate that I was not looking at
myself in the mirror while driving.) Thus, the source of this information in the content of my observer memory must be other
than the perceptual experience on which my memory originates. It must be testimony, the imagination or perhaps reasoning
from some other facts that I remember about myself. In either of those cases, it seems that my observer memory will be
distorted with regards to the content of my belief. For the relevant parts of the content of my memory (my having looked
unshaven at the time, for instance) do not belong to the content of any of my perceptual experiences during the accident.14
Thus, it seems that my faculty of memory has not carried out its preservative function adequately while delivering that observer
memory. But has it, nonetheless, produced a memory that is somehow beneﬁcial for me to have?
Let me introduce some terminology that may be useful at this point. By having a mental state of a certain type (such as a
perception, a sensation or a memory), a subject may experience some emotions or moods. We could call these the ‘affective
properties’ of the mental state. Also, by having a mental state of a certain type, the subject may have experiences that are
qualitatively similar to the experiences produced by the subject’s senses during episodes of perception. Let us call these
the ‘sensory properties’ of the mental state.15 Let us also use ‘feeling’ as an umbrella term that refers to both the affective
and the sensory properties of a mental state. Furthermore, let us refer to a mental state that is rich in affective properties as
‘affectively rich,’ to a mental state that is rich in sensory properties as ‘sensorily rich,’ and to a mental state that is rich in both
as ‘phenomenally rich.’ Let us also call mental states that are not sensorily, affectively or phenomenally rich, respectively, ‘sen-
sorily dry,’ ‘affectively dry’ and ‘phenomenally dry.’
Now, there are reasons to think that, whereas ﬁeld memories tend to be phenomenally rich, observer memories tend to
be phenomenally dry. Consider, for example, the following ﬁndings in two classical studies on the ﬁeld/observer distinc-
tion (Nigro & Neisser, 1983): Subjects who describe the contents of their ﬁeld memories often mention their feelings at
the time that they witnessed, or went through, the relevant events whereas subjects who describe the contents of their
observer memories make signiﬁcantly fewer references to their emotions and sensory experiences at the time.16 And, con-
versely, subjects who are trying to describe their feelings at the time that they witnessed, or went through, a remembered
event tend to remember that event from the ﬁeld perspective whereas subjects who are only trying to describe the circum-
stances surrounding the remembered event tend to remember it from the observer perspective. The narrower point that ﬁeld
memories are affectively richer than observer memories seems to be conﬁrmed by more recent ﬁndings. It seems, for exam-
ple, that a subject who remembers an event from her past is more likely to have a ﬁeld memory of it when the remembered
event has a strong emotional signiﬁcance for her than when it does not (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). Taken together, these
ﬁndings suggest that ﬁeld memories, as opposed to observer memories, have very salient phenomenal properties for the
subject.
If ﬁeld memories are phenomenally rich whereas observer memories are phenomenally dry, then one might wonder
whether it is possible to change the phenomenology of remembering a past event by switching from remembering it from
a ﬁeld perspective to remembering it from an observer perspective. In particular, one might wonder whether one might be
able to diminish, or dampen, the phenomenal properties of the memory by performing that switch. And, interestingly, there
does seem to be some evidence suggesting that this effect is possible (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Now, if it is possible to
change, and in fact diminish, the phenomenal properties of a memory of a past event by switching from remembering
the event from the ﬁeld perspective to remembering it from the observer perspective, then one can imagine a scenario in
which it may be advantageous for a subject to perform that switch. This is the scenario in which the event constituted a trau-
matic experience for the subject in the past.
It seems that traumatic events tend to be remembered, by default, from the ﬁeld perspective (Porter & Birt, 2001). Assum-
ing that ﬁeld memories are phenomenally rich, a subject who remembers a traumatic event from the ﬁeld perspective will
presumably be forced to relive some of her emotions and sensory experiences during the event, which is likely to result in
further trauma for her. It would seem, therefore, that such a subject would beneﬁt from switching to remembering the trau-
matic event from the ﬁeld perspective to remembering it from the observer perspective. For if remembering the traumatic
event from the observer perspective does indeed dampen the phenomenal properties of remembering the event, then having
an observer memory of the traumatic event should alleviate the suffering associated with reliving it in memory. It should14 From a reconstructive point of view, the memory is not distorted, since reconstruction of the past event in memory has happened in such a way that the
resulting memory coheres well with my beliefs about my past, such as the belief that I had a trafﬁc accident, the belief that I was driving at the time, and so on.
In fact, discussions of observer memory which take place against the background of the narrative conception of memory will not consider observer memories to
be cases of memory distortion. (See, for example, (Sutton, 2010).) My aim in this section, however, is not to argue for a particular notion of distortion. It is only
to make the case that observer memories are cases in which a subject’s faculty of memory did not carry out its preservative function, and yet it is still possible
for the resulting memory to have an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject.
15 In the particular case in which the mental state is a perception, the sensory properties of the mental state are the experiences actually produced by the
operation of the subject’s senses. (Here I am assuming that the relation of qualitative similarity is, like the relation of similarity, a reﬂexive relation.)
16 For similar ﬁndings, see (McIsaac & Eich, 2002).
542 J. Fernández / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 536–547allow the subject to achieve some ‘phenomenal distancing’ from the traumatic event.17 Thus, it seems that observer memories
of past events may carry an adaptive type of beneﬁt for the subject despite being distorted. Speciﬁcally, it seems that they may
be affectively adaptive for her. For representing a past event from an observer point of view can, when that event has been trau-
matic for the subject, be an effective way of satisfying one of the subject’s goals. The goal in question is, in this case, to alleviate
the suffering associated with reliving the event in memory.
Admittedly, things are not quite that simple. Let us keep in mind that whether or not a memory of a subject is adaptively
beneﬁcial for her depends on which of the subject’s goals we are focusing on. A memory may help the subject to achieve one
of her goals while not helping with, or perhaps even hindering her prospects of, achieving another. This may be the case with
observer memories. Even though a case can be made that observer memories of trauma are adaptively beneﬁcial with
regards to the short-term goal of achieving some affective relief, they may not help the subject to achieve the long-term goal
of maintaining a healthy self-concept. Picturing oneself from the outside, as it were, might be more conducive to subjecting
oneself to evaluation and, thus, it might increase the risk that one ﬁnds certain aspects of how one is perceived not to be
satisfactory enough.18 Thus, there may be a cost involved in adopting the observer perspective while remembering traumatic
events. And yet, observer memories can be adaptively beneﬁcial for the subject. The important point to bear in mind in order to
accommodate both of these facts at the same time is that a subject does not draw, from her memories, adaptive beneﬁts per se.
Instead, the adaptive beneﬁt of a subject’s memories must be relativised to each of the subject’s goals.
5. Fabricated memories of abuse
Over approximately the last twenty years, there has been a debate in cognitive science, sociology, psychiatry and the law
on whether or not accounts of long-forgotten episodes of childhood trauma elicited by some memory recovery techniques,
such as hypnosis and the use of sodium amytal, should be taken at face value. After undergoing treatment as part of certain
approaches to psychotherapy, a subject may claim to remember a traumatic event that happened to her as a child, even
though she was not able to remember it before her treatment. The issue in this debate has been whether such reports should
be trusted as expressions of accurate memories or not.19 Those who believe that these reports should be trusted refer to the
mental states being expressed through them as ‘recovered memories’ whereas those who believe that these reports should not
be trusted as expressions of accurate memories refer to the mental states being expressed through them as ‘false memories.’ On
the false memory camp, theorists such as Richard Ofshe have claimed that memories cannot be completely lost and, later, be
recovered (Ofshe & Watters, 1994). In addition, false memory theorists have argued that inaccurate memories can easily be
induced under experimental conditions (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Theorists on the recovered memory camp, by contrast, have
disputed the contention that psychotherapists have the power required to implant fabricated memories of whole events
(Harvey & Herman, 1994). Furthermore, they have appealed to independent evidence suggesting that the reactivation of trau-
matic experiences of other types, such as trauma during war, can occur after periods of time in which individuals experience
relatively few symptoms (Schooler, 1994). In this section, I will assume that some of the reports of recovered memories of
long-forgotten episodes of childhood trauma which arise during psychotherapy are not expressions of accurate memories. I will
assume that they are reports of a kind of memory which, due to the psychotherapist’s intended or unintended acts of sugges-
tion, the subject mistakenly takes to be an accurate memory of some (typically traumatic) past event. I will refer to these mem-
ories as ‘fabricated’ memories.20 In this section, I wish to put forward the claim that fabricated memories of traumatic events
could, in extremely unusual circumstances, qualify as cases of beneﬁcial memory distortion.
In order to argue that fabricated memories of traumatic events can be beneﬁcial despite being distorted one must, ﬁrst of
all, make the case that they are indeed distorted. From a preservative point of view, it should be uncontroversial that they
are. Suppose that I have a memory of my childhood in which I represent an uncle who was visiting at the time as having
molested me by touching me in a sexual way. It turns out, however, that the uncle in question never molested me. Thus,
the source of that piece of information in the content of my memory must be other than my past perceptual experiences
of him. Let us stipulate that this memory has arisen during psychotherapy and it is, as a matter of fact, a memory fabricated
by me as a result of my therapist’s use of some techniques of suggestion. In that case, it seems that my fabricated memory is
certainly distorted. For it fails to present my uncle to me in any way in which I apparently perceived him to be in the past.
Thus, it seems that my faculty of memory has not carried out its preservative function adequately while delivering the mem-
ory that I am having. But has it, nonetheless, produced a memory that it could be beneﬁcial for me to have?
It is hard to imagine how any of the actual cases of fabricated memories of traumatic events and, especially, fabricated
memories of abuse could possibly be beneﬁcial for the subject. In actual cases of fabricated memories of abuse, the subjects17 On phenomenal distancing for emotional properties of remembering, see (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). On phenomenal distancing for sensory
properties of remembering, see (McNamara, Benson, McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005).
18 This would explain, for example, why depressed adolescents have been found to be more likely to have observer memories than ﬁeld memories (Kuyken &
Howell, 2006).
19 For recent discussions of this issue, see, for example, (Belli, 2012), (Mendez & Fras, 2011), (Goodman et al., 2011), and (Dalenberg & Palesh, 2010).
20 I will reserve the term ‘false memory’ for the view according to which all reports of allegedly recovered memories of long-forgotten traumatic events during
psychotherapy are in fact reports of fabricated memories. Notice that I am being neutral on whether the false memory view, thus construed, is correct or not. I
am only assuming that there are such things as fabricated memories, which seems hard to deny in light of the evidence produced by those in the false memory
camp.
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selves be traumatized by those memories, but also their families can be torn apart and reputations can be destroyed by sub-
sequent accusations of abuse. In actual fact, lives are often ruined by fabricated memories of abuse. Nevertheless, one can
conceive some highly unlikely sets of circumstances in which, arguably, having a fabricated memory of a past episode of
abuse could carry an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject. My contention is that it is in fact possible to imagine two such sets
of circumstances; a set of circumstances in which it is affectively adaptive for the subject to have such a memory, and a
set of circumstances in which it is explanatorily adaptive for her. Let us consider the two scenarios in order.
Let us imagine that, early in my childhood, I once witnessed my uncle giving a terrible beating to my mother; his sister. In
fact, let us imagine that it was so early in my childhood that I am no longer able to recover that memory. Many years later, I
invariably feel the desire to hate my uncle whenever I need to interact with him. Every time that I am in his presence, I rea-
lise that, quite simply, I want to hate the guy. This makes me ashamed of myself since, not being able to remember anything
about the violent incident that I once witnessed, I cannot ﬁnd anything particularly despicable about my uncle. And I
strongly disapprove of the type of person who, as I see it, I would become by hating someone unwarrantedly. So I do not
allow myself to experience hate towards my uncle. And yet, I wish that I was able to hate him. I cannot deny it. I am fully
aware of my desire to hate him. And worse, I am fully aware that, in spite of the fact that all my efforts to ﬁnd some justifying
reason for it have failed, my desire to hate my uncle remains. The resilience of this desire is upsetting for me, so I ﬁnd myself
in a strange dilemma: On the one hand, I have a desire whose satisfaction would have very negative evaluative consequences
for my own self-concept. On the other hand, I cannot get rid of it. I experience it as an intrusive desire; a desire that is beyond
my rational control. One can picture how the whole situation would be deeply disturbing for me.
Consider, now, the fabricated memory wherein I represent my uncle as molesting me while I was a child. Fabricating this
memory would provide me with a reason which, in my view, entitles me to hate my uncle. And this, in turn, would allow me
to experience hate towards him without any harm to my own self-concept. Thus, it seems that, in this scenario, my fabri-
cated memory of abuse is beneﬁcial despite being distorted. I beneﬁt from having it in the sense that representing a past
episode of abuse that never happened turns out to be an effective way of satisfying one of my goals. The goal in question
is, in this case, to manage to occupy, consistently with my own set of values, an emotional state that I feel the need to expe-
rience. To that extent, my fabricated memory of abuse has an affectively adaptive beneﬁt for me.
Wemay also imagine a set of circumstances in which my fabricated memory of abuse is explanatorily beneﬁcial for me to
have. In order to describe it, one only needs to tweak some of the details in the conceivable scenario sketched above. Let us
suppose that I did witness my uncle giving a terrible beating to my mother, and that I am no longer able to remember that
event. Let us imagine, however, that I do not currently experience the desire to hate him. But I do ﬁnd that I am inclined to
behave negatively towards my uncle whenever I need to interact with him. I avoid giving him a hug or shaking his hand, I
often ﬁnd a reason to leave the room during a family reunion that involves him, I accidentally break his Christmas gifts, and
so on. Let us suppose that I have insight into the fact that my behaviour reveals a dislike for him. However, not being able to
remember the beating that I once witnessed, I cannot ﬁnd a reason for that behaviour. I cannot explain why I am behaving in
a hurtful way towards my uncle when I need to interact with him, which is puzzling for me. It is also upsetting, in that my
disposition to behave in a hurtful way towards him remains despite all my failing efforts to ﬁnd an explanation for it. That is,
the fact that I cannot make that behaviour intelligible to myself has done nothing to change it. Thus, I feel alienated from
some of my dispositions to action. I experience them as dispositions that are beyond my rational control. It is easy to picture
how this conﬂict would be equally disturbing for me.
Consider, now, the fabricated memory wherein I represent my uncle as molesting me while I was a child. Fabricating this
memory would provide me with a reason which, in my view, explains why I am inclined to behave negatively towards my
uncle. And this, in turn, would allowme to experience my relevant actions as actions that are rational: It would seem rational
for me to perform those actions given that I can ﬁnd a reason for performing them. Thus, it seems that, in this scenario, my
fabricated memory of abuse is beneﬁcial for me despite being distorted. Once again, I beneﬁt from having it in the sense that
representing a past episode of abuse that never happened turns out to be an effective way of satisfying one of my goals. The
goal in question is, in this case, to make sense of some behavioural dispositions which I am unable to shake off. To that
extent, my fabricated memory of abuse has an explanatorily adaptive beneﬁt for me.
Once again, though, things are not quite that simple, for reasons that will be reminiscent of our discussion of observer
memories. Recall that a memory may help its subject to achieve one of her goals while not helping with, or perhaps even
hindering her prospects of, achieving another. And, for that reason, the memory may carry an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject
with regards to the former goal, but not with regards to the latter one. This may be the case with fabricated memories. Even
though it can be argued that fabricated memories of abuse could be beneﬁcial with regards to the goal of allowing oneself to
feel a certain emotion towards a person or event, or the goal of making sense of one’s own mental states and behaviour
towards that person or event, they may not help the subject to achieve some of her other goals. As noted above, thinking
of oneself as having been abused is likely to result in trauma. It is also likely to damage one’s social relations. (This is obvious
when it comes to one’s relations with the person wrongly accused of being the abuser.) From the point of view of the goals of
avoiding trauma and maintaining fulﬁlling social relations, therefore, it is not adaptively beneﬁcial for a subject to fabricate a
memory of having been abused. And yet, there are contexts in which it is possible for fabricated memories of abuse to be
adaptively beneﬁcial for the subject. Once again, there is no inconsistency here, provided that adaptive beneﬁts are relati-
vised to the subject’s goals.
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Let us take stock. In Section 2, we have seen two pictures of what memory is supposed to do. On one of those pictures,
memory is supposed to preserve the information that we acquired through perception in the past. On the other one, memory
is supposed to build a narrative of our personal past. In Section 1, we have seen the beneﬁts of memory performing each of
those two functions appropriately while producing memories; an epistemic beneﬁt and an adaptive beneﬁt for the subject.
However, in Sections 3 and 4, we have also seen that memory may fail to perform one of its functions adequately while pro-
ducing memories which are, in some sense, beneﬁcial for the subject to have. Speciﬁcally, we have seen that a subject’s fac-
ulty of memory can be unreliable while delivering some memories which have some value for the subject, either from an
affectively adaptive point of view or from an explanatorily adaptive point of view. What does this possibility mean for
the two conceptions of memory sketched in Section 2?
There are two ways of looking at the relation between the storage conception of memory and the narrative conception of
memory. If one takes what we may call an ‘exclusive’ approach to them, then one will believe that memory is either a faculty
that is meant to perform a preservative function within our cognitive economy, or it is a faculty that is meant to perform a
reconstructive function within it; but not both. On this approach, then, either the function of memory is to preserve the
information that we acquired in the past through perception, or the function of memory is to build a narrative of our per-
sonal past. In the former case, the narrative conception of memory is wrong whereas, in the latter case, it is the storage con-
ception of memory that is wrong. Either way, both of them cannot be right.
If one takes an exclusive approach towards the relation between the storage and narrative conceptions of memory, and
one endorses the narrative conception of memory, then observer memories of trauma and fabricated memories of abuse do
not qualify as cases of beneﬁcial distortion after all. Speciﬁcally, if the narrative conception of memory is correct and the
storage conception is wrong, then neither observer memories of trauma nor fabricated memories of abuse are distorted.
For if the considerations offered in Section 1 are correct, then those memories must have been, in a certain sense, appropri-
ately produced in order for them to be adaptively beneﬁcial for the subject. The relevant sense is that memory must have
carried out its reconstructive function appropriately while delivering them.
Observer memories of trauma, for example, cannot help the subject to achieve some phenomenal distancing from the
remembered traumatic event if they do not cohere well with the rest of things that the subject remembers about the event,
and the things that she knows about her own physical appearance in the past. Suppose, for example, that my observer mem-
ory of my trafﬁc accident does not represent me as having the physical traits that I believe I had at the time of the accident.
Suppose, furthermore, that my observer memory does not represent my car as having the colour, shape and size that I
believe it had at the time of the accident. Then, I will not be able to identify myself as the person who suffered the accident
by having that observer memory. It is difﬁcult to see, then, how that memory could allowme to stop remembering the trafﬁc
accident from a ﬁeld perspective and start remembering it in a more phenomenally detached way. After all, if I cannot iden-
tify myself as the person who suffered the accident, then why would I recognise the mental state that I am occupying as a
memory of something that happened to me at all?
Similarly, fabricated memories of abuse cannot help the subject to achieve some emotional state that she is seeking to
experience, or some understanding of her own current behaviour and mental life, if they do not cohere well with the rest
of things that the subject remembers about the circumstances surrounding the alleged episode of abuse, and the things
that she knows about the participants in that episode. Suppose, for example, that I have a fabricated memory of abuse
involving my uncle, but it is not consistent with some of the things I know about what was going on at the time. Suppose
that I know that my uncle was not in town when, according to my fabricated memory, I suffered his sexual abuse.
Suppose that I also know that the house where he is supposed to have visited us did not look at all like my memory
is presenting it to me. Let us say that my memory does not even represent my uncle as I believe he looked like at
the time. It would be surprising if, given these inconsistencies, I still proceeded to trust my fabricated memory as a mem-
ory of a genuine event in my past. In fact, I might even be able to suspect that the memory that I am having has been
fabricated by me. It is difﬁcult to see, then, how that memory could give me a justifying reason for allowing myself to
experience hate towards my uncle, or it could provide me with an explanatory reason of my behaviour towards my
uncle.
Thus, if one takes an exclusive approach towards the relation between the storage and narrative conceptions of memory,
and one assumes that memory can only have a reconstructive function, then one must conclude that memory has performed
its function properly while delivering those observer memories of trauma and fabricated memories of abuse which are adap-
tively beneﬁcial for the subject to have. Otherwise, they could not be adaptive in the ﬁrst place. Admittedly, this conclusion
allows the narrative theorist to capture the intuition that there is something right, and not distorted, about the way in which
those memories have been generated. And this is indeed an intuition worth capturing. We do feel its pull. Unfortunately,
though, there is a signiﬁcant cost to adopting this position.
As we saw in Section 1, if the fact that memory is carrying out its function appropriately when it delivers a memorymakes
no difference as to whether that memory is likely to be correct, then one cannot be justiﬁed in forming beliefs about one’s
personal past on the basis of one’s memories. And, for that reason, one’s memories cannot provide one with knowledge of
one’s personal past. Now, if one believes that the function of memory is exclusively reconstructive, then it seems that this is
precisely the conclusion that one should draw. For the fact that memory has carried out its reconstructive function
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of fact, the types of memories discussed in Sections 3 and 4 illustrate this point.) Thus, an exclusive approach to the relation
between the storage and narrative conceptions of memory, combined with an endorsement of the latter, leads us to the
conclusion that memory cannot provide us with knowledge of our personal past. This seems too high a price to pay for pre-
serving the view that those memories which are adaptively beneﬁcial for the subject are, in some intuitive sense, not
distorted.
Things are not better if one adopts an exclusive approach towards the relation between the storage and narrative concep-
tions of memory, but one endorses the storage conception instead. In that case, one can capture the intuition that there is
something distorted about the way in which observer memories and fabricated memories are generated since, as we saw in
Sections 3 and 4, they are indeed distorted from a preservative point of view. But there is a signiﬁcant cost to adopting this
position as well. For the fact that some of those memories can be, under certain circumstances, beneﬁcial for the subject
becomes, then, a mystery. Let me explain.
The storage theorist who takes an exclusive approach towards the two conceptions of memory is committed to the
view that the faculty of memory never carries out its function appropriately when it produces observer memories and fab-
ricated memories. However, if memory is not carrying out its function adequately when it produces observer memories
and fabricated memories, then it is hard to understand why some of those memories can actually do some good for
the subject. After all, in Sections 3 and 4, we have seen that the reason why some of those memories can be beneﬁcial
for the subject is that they serve a certain purpose for the subject. They are aimed at providing something for the subject;
something that the subject is in need of. (The aim in question may involve either an emotion or an explanation.) But if
memory is never doing what it is supposed to do when it generates those memories, then it is hard to see why, in some
cases, the generation of those memories happens to serve a purpose for the subject. What explains the fact that those
memories are meant to achieve a certain goal, a goal that it is in the subject’s interest to achieve, if they have been acci-
dentally generated?
An alternative approach to the relation between the storage and narrative conceptions of memory is what we may call an
‘inclusive’ approach to them. According to it, memory is a faculty that is meant to perform a preservative function within our
cognitive economy, and it is also a faculty that is meant to perform a reconstructive function within it. On this approach,
then, the function of memory is to preserve the information that we acquired in the past through perception, and the func-
tion of memory is to build a smooth narrative of our personal past as well. What is the relevance of the considerations offered
in Sections 3 and 4 for this approach?
If one takes an inclusive approach towards the relation between the storage and narrative conceptions of memory,
then one can capture two important intuitions about beneﬁcial observer memories and beneﬁcial fabricated memories
which have been highlighted above; the intuition that there is something wrong, and the intuition that there is some-
thing right, about the way in which those memories have been generated. On the one hand, there is something wrong in
that memory has not performed its preservative function adequately while delivering those memories. This is why we
are inclined to think that there is a sense in which they are distorted. Capturing this intuition by accepting that there
is a preservative function of memory which, in those cases, has not been carried out appropriately allows us to hang
on to the idea that, in order for our memories to yield knowledge of our personal past, memory must carry out its func-
tion appropriately while delivering them. For this is indeed true of the preservative function of memory. On the other
hand, there is something right about the way in which observer memories of trauma and fabricated memories of abuse
have been generated when those memories are beneﬁcial for the subject. For if the inclusive approach is correct, then
memory has a reconstructive function as well. And it seems that memory has performed that function adequately while
delivering those memories. After all, the considerations above suggest that, unless memory maintains a certain coherence
within the subject’s mental states when it delivers observer memories of trauma and fabricated memories of abuse,
those memories cannot be adaptively beneﬁcial for the subject. Assuming that there can be, as argued in Sections 3
and 4, beneﬁcial cases of such memories, it seems that we must accept that memory has performed a certain function
appropriately while delivering those memories, namely, a reconstructive function. The outcome of these considerations,
therefore, seems to be that the correct approach to take towards the storage and narrative conceptions of memory is the
inclusive approach.
The view that the function of memory is both to preserve the information that we acquired in the past through percep-
tion, and to build a smooth narrative of our personal past, is not new. It resonates, for example, with the so-called ‘Self-Mem-
ory System (SMS)’ conceptual framework (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004).
One of the central claims within the SMS framework is that memory must negotiate two demands; that of accurately record-
ing ongoing activity (‘correspondence’ in the SMS terminology) and that of maintaining a coherent record of the self’s past
activity (‘coherence’ in the SMS terminology). The idea is that a healthy faculty of memory will meet those demands in an
appropriately calibrated way. Now, that central idea in SMS is similar to, but different from, the view that has been offered
here. For the reasons why, according to the view offered here, the preservative and reconstructive functions of memory are
important are different from the reasons why, within the SMS framework, it is important for our memories to meet the
demands of correspondence and coherence.
I have argued that building a smooth narrative of one’s past is necessary for the purposes of experiencing a certain emo-
tion towards some events in one’s past, and for the purposes of making sense of one’s attitudes towards that event. By con-
trast, the reason why, within the SMS framework, it is important for our memories to meet the demand of coherence is that
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reality.21 The difference is that, whereas it is necessary for one to achieve a certain emotion towards an event in one’s past (or
for one to make sense of one’s attitudes towards that event, for that matter) that one has a stable sense of self, a stable sense of
self does not seem to be sufﬁcient for one to achieve those emotional or explanatory goals. After all, we would not want to claim
that all subjects who have not emotionally processed, or have not achieved some emotional closure with respect to, some trau-
matic event in their past no longer have a consistent sense of self.22
I have also argued that possessing a faculty of memory that reliably preserves the information that we acquired in the
past through perception is necessary for the memories that such a faculty produces to afford knowledge of our personal past.
By contrast, the reason why, within the SMS framework, it is important for our memories to meet the demand of correspon-
dence is that our memories must keep track of where we are in the process of achieving a certain goal. Otherwise, dysfunc-
tional repetitions of action sequences will ensue, since we will not accurately remember having already performed the
necessary actions to achieve some of our goals. The difference is that, whereas it is correct that if a memory provides a sub-
ject with knowledge of her past, then it will allow her to keep track of the fact that she has just performed an action that
needs to be performed in order to achieve one of her goals, the converse is not the case. All the subject needs in order to
keep track of the fact that she has just performed an action which she is required to perform in order to achieve one of
her goals is the true belief that she has just done so. And, as we saw in Section 1, a true belief which allows us to achieve
one of our goals does not need to be justiﬁed and, for that reason, it does not need to amount to knowledge.23
What lesson can be drawn, then, from our discussion in this section? If the inclusive approach to the functions of memory
is the correct approach to take, then it seems that we can draw an interesting lesson from the fact that there is such a thing as
beneﬁcial memory distortion. Instances of beneﬁcial memory distortion teach us that memory has various functions, and
they teach us that the adequate performance of each of those functions can, conceivably, come apart from each other. Mem-
ory distortion, in other words, reveals that memory is supposed to do various things. At the very least, it is supposed to pre-
serve the information that we acquired through perception in the past, which is why instances of beneﬁcial memory
distortion are instances of distortion. And it is supposed to provide us with a narrative of our personal past, which is why
instances of beneﬁcial memory distortion are beneﬁcial. Furthermore, cases of beneﬁcial memory distortion illustrate the
fact that memory can, in principle, do the latter without doing the former. Ultimately, then, what cases of beneﬁcial memory
distortion teach us about the nature of memory is that memory performing its reconstructive function does not necessarily
depend on memory performing its preservative function. There is no logical or conceptual link that ties our notions of those
two functions together. In that sense, our capacity to reconstruct our personal past in memory is different from our capacity
to acquire knowledge of it through memory.24References
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